Yukon Territory of northern Canada and erected Dawson City practically overnight, demonstrated how unmanageable resource development could be. The Klondike was not an isolated case. Sandon, British Columbia and Cobalt, Ontario were only two of many other examples of instant, unplanned, and unruly mining camps characterized by hard-drinking miners, prostitution, and ramshackle accommodation.
vi Communities built by employees were open to anyone, democratically operated, and subject to Canadian laws. However, communities built on land owned by a private company were not subject to the same regulations. Mining companies saw the benefits of being able to control who lived close to their operations. For example, visitors to Britannia had to request permission before their arrival. In the 1920s and 1930s the property's general manager promptly fired anyone caught violating the company's alcohol prohibition, or showing pro-union sentiments. In Canada's undeveloped hinterland, company towns were usually isolated and closed communities, where mining companies exerted a great degree of control over their employees.
However, even if mining companies built stable communities for their employees, they had little control over the resource they mined; once a mineral was depleted, or prices dropped below the price of extraction, many mines closed and company towns were left deserted. Mine closures happened regularly throughout the twentieth century. When Britannia was shutdown in 1958, some residents could likely recall the experiences of Phoenix and Anyox, British
Columbia. These copper mining towns had been bustling one week and abandoned the nextPhoenix stopped mining in 1919; Anyox closed in 1935. The sorry fate of these and other mining towns in British Columbia made it seem likely that Britannia was destined to disappear.
Canadian scholars have defined failed company towns as the inevitable victims of a boom-and-bust economy. vii While many have commented on these communities' economic dependence on a single resource, fewer have examined the process of de-industrialization in these places. viii As John Bradbury and Isabelle St-Martin argue, the existing literature on singleindustry towns focuses on the birth, youth, and maturity, as opposed to the death, of such communities. ix In his comprehensive study of Canadian resource towns, Rex Lucas suggests resource town development occurred in stages, from construction to maturity.
x Bradbury and StMartin have extended Lucas' typology to include the "winding down" and "closure" stages of resource town experience. This life cycle metaphor is both helpful and dangerous. While it has facilitated the study and comparison of varied resource communities, it is less useful for historical analysis for two reasons. First, it removes resource towns from their varied contexts, suggesting towns followed a typical development pattern regardless of time or place.
Furthermore, although Lucas, Bradbury, and St-Martin insist community development is a nonlinear process, the life cycle framework implies that de-industrialization-like death-is an inevitable part of resource community existence. xi This approach also ignores the role of community in the de-industrialization process.
DEFINING COMMUNITY
While historians have often assumed that readers know what community means, or limited its scope to "the ideas of a shared place and a static, self-contained entity," xii this study defines community in two, interconnecting ways. Community is seen as both a continuous process of constructing and sustaining social bonds, as well as a rhetorical tool that joins people imaginatively. Britannia's workers and residents developed their sense of community working and playing together, and also by emphasizing the common identities-such as miner, or housewife-that they believed they shared. As historian Thomas Bender argues, community is defined better as an experience than as a place;" it is something understood through relationships with others. xiii As relationships and power relations shift, so do a community's boundaries. This results in the inclusion of some people while necessarily excluding others. In Britannia's case, employees in 1958 were more likely to include the company in their definition of community than those in 1964, when most viewed the company as an outsider. During the earlier shutdown, workers' notions of community impeded worker solidarity, while in the latter, they facilitated it.
This approach recognizes that community is never solely a positive force; it simultaneously divides and unites.
Community is also a cultural construct. Benedict Anderson's notion of "imagined communities" has demonstrated that language can create feelings of commonality among people who will never meet, cultivating regional and national identities. xiv Britannia's managers often tried to conjure this type of community in their publicity, and the union similarly appealed to imagined local and national solidarities. In this study, community is examined as both a discursive construct and a social process, which was continuously formed and imagined in Britannia's mines, homes, and social clubs. Britannia's workers and residents challenged and appealed to these varied notions of community during times of crisis.
This chapter builds on the work of recent de-industrialization scholars, many of whom no longer assume that plant closures are inevitable or uniformly destructive occurrences. As
Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott have argued, de-industrialization is better conceived of as a non-linear process that changes-for good or ill-the social fabric of the affected community.
xv Indeed, when ghosts hovered over Britannia, the copper mine's fate was anything but sealed. The shutdowns did not destroy an ideal community, but refashioned it (traumatically, for many) in the eyes of its workers and residents. While the 1958 shutdown divided the workforce and scattered a Britannia community that had catered to married workers and encouraged loyalty to the company, it did not prevent new expressions of community from emerging later on. By 1964, Britannia's physical and social geographies had changed; many workers commuted, and the 1958 shutdown had curtailed many of the social and institutional structures that had previously fostered interaction and common identity. Nevertheless, a strike against their new employer brought workers together in solidarity and spawned rhetorical appeals to local and national community that bolstered their campaign. Furthermore, some residents were so weary from constant uncertainty that when the mine closed they reacted with relief as well as sadness. For example, Mrs. Simpson, a foundry worker's wife, told reporters her family was "in a rut, and maybe it would be good for us to While credit unions were rallying to support an organization in trouble, there was little equivalent sense of solidarity among Britannia's married residents, who had previously considered themselves dedicated, respectable community members. Gone were the group activities and meetings they had claimed made them a unified group. Many seemed eager to move on. Only a handful of families remained during the shutdown, either because they were hopeful the mine would eventually reopen, or because they saw few job prospects elsewhere.
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The apparent "death" of the town evoked mostly sadness, blunting any attempts at organized opposition to the mine's closure. was still a company-owned property, it was no longer a closed community. These changes affected the way remaining residents and new employees defined themselves as a community.
1964-CRISIS AS CATALYST
Britannia was no longer a remote town where residents believed people had to "make their own entertainment and fun." While organizations such as the church and Ladies' Auxiliary remained active, and the Britannia Beach Community Club continued to hold dances and baseball games, residents could now easily drive to Squamish or Vancouver for an evening's entertainment. After the road went through, "the people went their own way," remembered miner's wife Betty
Manson: "the closeness wasn't there." l Cohesiveness, stability, and active local participationcharacteristics that had shaped married residents' understanding of community before the 1958 shutdown-were less evident in the early 1960s. Residents who had previously relied on these characteristics to identify themselves as community members were left feeling that Britannia
Beach was no longer a community.
Even though some residents believed Britannia's community spirit had waned after the 1958 shutdown, the 1964 strike and shutdown fostered a renewed sense of unity in the face of instability. The strike acted as a catalyst, exposing employees' shared vulnerability at the hands of a large company, and providing some of Britannia's workers with a renewed sense of community that motivated them to act collectively. "The solidarity of the working people is The union also provided a common program around which employees could rally.
Workers and residents were working toward a common goal, and assisting each other. The result was a noted "return of community interest which had not been in evidence for some years," as one woman told a Squamish Times reporter: "It's almost as if the strike has brought us all closer together." lv Betty McNair believed the picket lines and the efforts of the strike committees had prompted "more visiting and togetherness" than "since before the road opened." lvi The strike provided a rallying point for many employees, creating a level of social interaction not seen since before 1958. While exclusive notions of community divided residents in 1958, the sense of community precipitated by the 1964 strike helped to unite and sustain workers during the period of uncertainty.
LOYALTY AND HOSTILITY: INCLUDING AND EXCLUDING THE COMPANY FROM THE COMMUNITY
The union's ability to foster a renewed sense of community at Britannia was particularly significant given the circumstances the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers faced as a known "Red" union during the Cold War. Since the late 1940s, the union had been subjected to continuous red baiting, and resisted attempts-both from inside and outside the labor movement-to purge its leadership of Communist Party members and sympathizers. lvii As a "centre of communist strength," Mine Mill was particularly susceptible; its members were harassed and its delegates prevented from attending union conventions in the United States. After all, BM&S had built the town sites and operated the mine for five decades. More so than single employees, married residents approved of the company's efforts to build infrastructure, such as the community church, and to provide benefits for stable workers. Married workers were more likely to benefit from employee incentives-such as life insurance and company store dividends-because they stayed at the mine longer on average than their unmarried co-workers, and because the company favored benefit schemes tied to employee loyalty and stability. lxi They also benefited from the company's low-rent housing, recreation facilities, hospitals, and schools.
They were encouraged to raise their children at Britannia and make it their home. Several longtime residents remembered how the company tried to help employees during the lean 1930s, extending store credit, stockpiling copper, and retaining as many married workers as possible on a reduced work schedule. lxii The goodwill generated by the company's acts made it more difficult for residents to blame BM&S for the shutdown. Since the 1920s, BM&S had engaged in a form of civic capitalism that, while it did not avert employer-employee conflict, in Philip Scranton's words, "bounded and channeled it, humanized it, and obstructed that abstraction and generalization from experience that could constitute class consciousness." lxiii Thus, although residents remembered the shutdown as "devastating," and "quite a shock," they believed the company had always been, in the words of one resident, "on guard for the welfare of the community," and hesitated to blame BM&S for the mine's closure. lxiv Some residents appeared unable to imagine Britannia without the company.
Conversely, in 1964 many employees believed the company was treating them unfairly.
This belief was due in part to the high price of copper at the time the company was pleading poverty. During the strike the price per ton continued to rise, from 209 pounds sterling in March 1964 to 245 pounds sterling six months later. lxv In this favorable economic climate, strike supporters saw the company's threat to close the mine as a mere "bargaining weapon," a way to force the workers to accept the company's contract offer. Union president and former Britannia employee Ken Smith called it an empty threat: "All along they have said they'd close if we didn't accept their proposals," he told reporters. "I won't believe it 'till they move out the track and hoisting equipment." lxvi In 1958 many residents believed the company had tried to avoid the shutdown until it had no other choice, but during the 1964 strike few believed the company was considering workers' interests. Some claimed the mine closure was "a deliberate attempt to jackup the market price of copper" by limiting supply. lxvii Many remembered the sacrifices the union had made to help the mine reopen. In 1959, the union had agreed to a 44-hour workweek and surrendered some of its benefits, and Ken Smith argued that, despite the mine's changed ownership, workers rightfully "expect some reciprocation now copper prices are up." lxviii Strikers found the company's threats more reprehensible because they believed their demands were reasonable. "We believe the men are entitled to a 40-hour week," miner's wife Sylvia Hoeflitch told the Squamish Times: "Practically everyone else has it." Smith claimed that, even if the company agreed to all the union's demands, conditions in Britannia would still not achieve parity with those at other British Columbia mines. lxix With copper prices high, many in Britannia believed the company was able to meet union demands, and felt mistreated when the company refused to compromise and threatened to close the mine permanently.
Employees also did not have the same sense of loyalty to the Anaconda Company that previous employees had shown BM&S. While BM&S had tried to foster loyalty and unity through welfare schemes, the Anaconda Company did little to establish such a social contract with its employees. lxx By the 1960s, the tenets of civic capitalism that BM&S had sustained since the 1920s were being replaced by ideas of global capitalism, in which shareholders' interests were paramount. lxxi Although BM&S was owned by an American parent company that operated three other mines, Britannia was always managed locally. The managers' longevity, autonomy, and paternalistic approach gave the mine a family-owned feel. lxxii Anaconda, on the other hand, was an American corporate "empire" of mining, transportation, lumber, and real estate companies. It owned subsidiaries in four countries, and had a reputation for using "coercion and persuasion to maintain control" over its employees. lxxiii Anaconda showed less consideration for Britannia's workers and residents than did BM&S. Miner's wife and long-time resident Olive Baxter noticed the difference between the companies' approaches. Under BM&S management, she remembered, "it was more like a big family. But when the Anaconda come [sic], they were more into industry…and it was more business." lxxiv Her feelings for BM&S were fond enough that she considered the company akin to a relative or friend, not a corporate entity. Baxter and her fellow residents felt less connected to the new mine owners, who had only been operating the mine for two years. They did not believe they owed Anaconda anything, and consequently it was easier to label the company an "outsider" and portray it as the enemy. The strike helped workers to redefine community in opposition to the company.
In 1958, the sustained co-operation between BM&S and the union during the months of uncertainty preceding the shutdown gave residents further proof that the company was concerned about their welfare. Initially, BM&S and Mine Mill disagreed over the best way to respond to falling copper prices. Each group used its own rhetoric to promote its preferred solution to the crisis. The company asked its employees to take a pay cut, calling for local unity and sacrifice to help keep the mine open. Management expected workers to share "the company's hardship through an emergency." On the other hand, the union refused to take a pay cut, believing to do so would be to "break faith" with the broader community of base-metal workers across Canada. Though there was sympathy for the company, worker solidarity was paramount. Despite their diverging notions of community, company officials and union leaders did not disagree for long.
Together, they reached several agreements that allowed the mine to continue operating. In late August, they rearranged work schedules to reduce labor costs. In October, workers gave up a five-cent per hour wage increase promised in their two-year contract, and agreed to work four This sense of helplessness and pessimism is evident in the language residents and observers used to describe the mine's closure. Their words often evoked images of death.
Resident Elsie Hamelin called the drop in copper prices Britannia's "death knell," while Mrs.
Robinson, the postmaster's wife, claimed that watching the mine close was like "sitting by the deathbed of an old friend." Vancouver's newspapers announced the town's unfortunate fate;
"Britannia Dies," one headline read, while another article claimed, "the life-blood is draining from Britannia." Reporters claimed there was an "eerie silence" in the quickly emptying town, and described the shutdown as a "tragedy." lxxxiii These images reinforced the presumed finality of the closure, and underlined the futility of disputing the company's actions. Death, it seemed, was inevitable. Britannia's ghost town status was all but assured.
While the 1958 shutdown was portrayed as the slow death of a town, Anaconda's actions in 1964 were seen as the unprovoked "murder of a community." Union leaders, strikers, and supporters were not despondent, but positive, insisting after several weeks on the picket line that the strike "remains solid" and "morale is high." lxxxiv Their rhetoric, instead of embracing death, evoked images of local and national community to garner wider support for their cause.
On one hand, strikers and supporters described Britannia as a close-knit community threatened by a heartless corporation. Union bulletins and newspaper reports employed what anthropologist Elizabeth Furniss has called the "politics of victimization." This does not imply that the union's claims about the company were unfounded or fabricated, but they were worded to emphasize Britannia's small size and the hardworking nature of its residents in order to highlight the "discrepancies of power" between the company and the community. The technique transformed Britannia's seeming powerlessness into a moral authority that could be used to justify the union's actions. lxxxv This was a David versus Goliath struggle. Union bulletins often described the strikers as "little local 663," while the company was termed "the Anaconda giant"
or the "giant metal monopoly." Union leaders reminded strikers and supporters that the company was a "billion dollar" enterprise, the "world's largest copper producer." By reinforcing the disparities of resources and power between Anaconda and its employees, the strikers were trying to demonstrate the integrity of their cause. The company was a bully, they claimed, whose "every Scrooge tactic … only serves to stiffen the resistance of the workers." The workers were the "good and faithful long-service employees," the "miners and their families who over the In an effort to save their jobs and town, residents and employees began imagining community on a larger scale than they had in 1958.
Strikers used nationalist rhetoric in two ways. First, they described themselves as part of a national community of workers that needed to defend itself against American corporations.
Union leaders argued all Canadian workers should be concerned about the attempt to close Britannia mine, because a victory against Anaconda would "benefit workers everywhere." Union president Ken Smith offered the attempted closure as evidence that "absentee landlords As these examples illustrate, other unions, politicians, and private citizens shared the union's fears about increasing American control of Canadian industries. Many believed the union's assertions that, as members of the same country, they belonged to the same community of interest as the Britannia strikers, and therefore should send the miners assistance and support.
Although neither the federal nor provincial government introduced legislation or took steps to nationalize the mine, many people saw the strike in Britannia as an attempt to stand up to foreign companies. This was a community, whether imagined locally or nationally, defending its interests. The financial and moral support strikers received as a result of their nationalist appeals sustained their campaign for eight months-long enough to convince both union and company officials to return to the bargaining However, in 1964 understandings of community motivated many workers to act collectively.
Striking employees believed the shutdown gave them a common purpose and a common opponent in the company. They were able to embrace notions of local and national community that broadened their struggle and garnered support from outside Britannia's boundaries.
Employees' experiences during these crises underline the often sporadic and inconsistent nature of de-industrialization. They remind us that resource town closures cannot be characterized as inevitable or tragic; these are dynamic periods of intense change, shaped by both material realities, such as income and commodity prices, and discursive factors, such as loyalty and community, that deserve more focused historical attention. Other town sites and abandoned industrial relics likely hold similarly complex stories, most still awaiting scholarly exploration.
Not only do Britannia's shutdowns reveal how community identity shaped workers' responses to de-industrialization in unexpected ways, they also help debunk the notion that the post-war era in
Canada was a time of labour stability and worker prosperity. Shutdowns that occurred in this period reinforce the idea that, historically, de-industrialization has been a process, in Cowie and The exact number employed at Britannia varied continuously, but averaged 600 to 800 workers during the 1950s. In the 1960s, the workforce was much reduced, averaging closer to 350 employees at the mine.
iv Politicians sympathetic to labor repeatedly called for company towns to be "opened up," and claimed company authority violated workers' rights. For examples see Victoria Daily Times, 11 March 1919, 4; Vancouver Sun, 13 February 1934, 16; Victoria Daily Times, 13 February 1943, 2; Victoria Daily Times, 29 February 1944, 8; Victoria Daily Times, 26 February 1944, 5. v 
